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Abstract 
A recent common view of finance experts is that it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand how the economy as a 
whole works. Although the efficient market theory might be considered an ideal model enabling the interpretation of market 
behavior, it has begun to lose ground, and the rationality hypothesis failed to explain the excessive volatility of the returns 
and trading volume recorded on both developed capital markets and emerging ones. Adding the behavioral finance 
perspective to the equation can help us to understand better how market agents will react. In this article, we investigate the 
factors that may explain the trading volume evolution on two emerging capital markets, Romania and Brazil. We analyze 
the impact of both investors who ground their trading behavior on rational expectations and investors who show behavioral 
errors as independent variables on the trading volume as dependent variable. The period under analysis covers four years, 
from June 2009 to June 2013, and includes the daily values of the most important indices traded on both markets, i.e. BET 
for Romania and IBOVESPA for Brazil, and the daily trading volume for each of the two indices. The results indicate that 
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1. Introduction 
It is necessary to introduce new factors in addition to rational expectations to explain the evolution of returns 
and trading volume in the capital markets. Some of the new research trends approach financial markets from a 
biological perspective, more precisely an evolutionary one, based on the assumption that markets, instruments, 
institutions and investors evince a dynamic interaction and evolution, according to the “laws” of economic 
selection. Starting from this assumption, financial actors compete and adapt, however not relying on optimum 
behavior. 
The behavioral finance investigates the subtle facets and interactions in the human brain, faced with the 
uncertainty of making economic decisions. The most common human traits (fear, anger, greed, selflessness) 
place considerable emphasis on our decisions about money. Intellect (grasping a situation), reason (long-term 
consequences of the action taken) and emotion (considering a course of action) are all interrelated; they are the 
springs behind human decision. Human behavior is generally reactive, not proactive; therefore, it is difficult to 
make predictions on the basis of narrow rules. Behavioral finances can relatively easily explain why an 
individual has made a decision, but have difficulty in quantifying what effects that decision will have on the 
individual. 
Information is a public set of data, made available to everyone in an objective manner. Information can have 
a material impact on the asset price when it is combined with knowledge, hands-on experience and assessment 
of investors. Investors interpret important data and events on two cognitive levels: 
• the intellectual level of ordering, processing and analyzing the actual factors (economic data); 
• the level of the logical and rational understanding of how this objective identifies factors that will influence 
the perception of other market players. 
The concept of information can be defined only by relevant data at some point on the market, but must be 
correlated with the amount of professional knowledge (human intellect) and interpersonal dynamics of market 
players (emotions and feelings). Moreover, due to uncertainty and constant change, there is a strong 
interdependence between experiences (autobiographical memory) and rational expectations about the future. 
Our experiences influence the way we view the available data based on relevance. If we add to these the 
decision equation (where the accuracy of the decision is recorded only ex post), time pressure, decision-related 
stress, we obtain the sum of the insecurities of the interactions between the rational and irrational. 
Assessing market participants’ psychological reasoning is very important − since other market players’ 
decisions and actions have a decisive effect upon one’s success or failure (Game Theory, J. Nash, 1950: 
Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proceedings of the National Academy of the USA, 36(1):48-49). In this 
case, building expectations is subject to time and constant insecurity pressure. 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) substitute the rationality hypothesis to the investors’ behavior to explain the 
volatility of market profits. They attribute economic dysfunction especially to what they call “animal spirits” 
and extend the General Theory (The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, McMillan London) 
developed by Keynes J. M. in 1936. The latter defined animal spirit as “a spontaneous urge to action, rather 
than inaction”. Although the author considered that most economic activities have rational economic 
motivations, people also have non-economic reasons, much of the economic activity being governed by these 
animal spirits. With this respect, the authors state that it is “necessary to incorporate animal spirits into 
macroeconomic theory in order to know how the economy really works.” They extend Keynes’s definition, the 
term “animal spirits” referring to the investors’ irrational behavior, as this comprises, among others, optimism, 
pessimism and spontaneous reaction. In modern economics, “animal spirits” have been coined into an 
economic term that refers to the restlessness and inconsistency existing in today’s economy. 
Another author (Dhaoui, 2011) has shown in his study that the economy is behavior driven particularly by 
these animal spirits. He considered that excessive volatility results from the presence of optimistic, pessimistic 
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and spontaneous investors. The assumption that investors carry out orders rationally does not explain how the 
economy works. 
In formulating expectations, investors rely on their ability to gather, process and comprehend a mosaic of 
information. This ability is systematically subject to errors. According to Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, confidence 
is one of the most important aspects of animal spirits. They believe that confidence, signifying the behaviour 
beyond the rational approach to decision-making plays a major role in the economy. When people have 
confidence, they get down to business and buy. They make decisions spontaneously. The asset value is high 
and may be on the increase. But when they are distrustful, they withdraw and sell (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009, p 
38). 
Access to the right information may however lead to wrong decisions (wrong decisions made while being 
informed vs. decisions made while being uninformed). An incorrect decision may lead to under-reaction or 
over-reaction to relevant market information. Delayed reactions are a direct consequence of an excess of 
confidence in the ability to process and grasp information. The individual is mentally rooted in past choices and 
resistant to any new information that is at odds with his set of beliefs. An interesting example of mental 
anchoring is price discount during sales periods. People buy on impulse, not because of low prices but because 
they are sure that they strike a great bargain. Over-reacting is a direct consequence of mental generalizations 
and representation. By generalizing, people tend to extrapolate existing information, often based on a single 
observation that they consider to be relevant (stereotomy). The most recent event has the greatest impact on 
autobiographical memory. Recent loss or gain is more emotionally significant and has high social impact. 
People tend to leave out high impact yet hardly probable negative events. Because of their low probability, 
these events do not happen very often. Therefore, they are disregarded, although their effects on the investment 
portfolio are disastrous. Events with high emotional impact, although rare, have a major impact, which cannot 
be erased from one’s mind. Any subsequent decision will consider this momentous gain or loss. 
In addition to the above presentation of behavior errors occurring on the capital market, we may make a 
graphic description of their mechanism as being similar to that of a pendulum continuously oscillating between 
optimistic investors (who have security prices rise unfoundedly) and pessimistic investors (who have security 
prices fall unnecessarily). Optimistic investors, like confident ones, are more willing to make risky investments. 
They make irrational transactions, and their irrational reactions can lead to abnormal volatility in returns and 
trading volume. 
Each investor’s emotional make-up may in many cases annul the benefits of a rigorous scientific attitude 
based on calculations and intelligence. In the following, we study the effects induced by temperament on 
investment behavior, influencing trading volume evolution. Elements such as investor confidence leading to 
over-reaction (Barber and Odean, 2001; Daniel et al., 2001), optimism (Scheier and Carver, 1985), pessimism 
(Barberis et al., 1998, Kruger and Barrus, 2004) or, broadly speaking, animal spirits (Akerlof and Shiller, 
2009), are taken into account to explain the link between investor behavior and trading volume. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used in view of attaining the goal of 
this paper, the methods we used for the modelling of the following independent variables: confidence, 
optimism, pessimism and rational expectations.  In Section 3 we describe the empirical results and we discuss 
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2. Modeling independent variables: confidence, optimism, pessimism, rational expectations 
 
The purpose of the analysis is to investigate the factors that may explain the trading volume evolution on 
two emerging capital markets, Romania and Brazil. We want to analyze the impact of both investors who 
ground their trading behavior on rational expectations and investors who show behavioral errors of the type 
described above as independent variables on the trading volume as dependent variable. The period under 
analysis covers four years, from June 2009 to June 2013, and includes the daily values of the most important 
indices traded on both markets, i.e. BET for Romania and IBOVESPA for Brazil, and the daily trading volume 
for each of the two indices. 
Modeling the investors’ behavior, which is exposed to errors, is not an easy task, as no such model 
incorporating the investors’ behavioral errors in a more comprehensive manner has been devised so far. Our 
approach to modeling these behavior variables is presented below, so as to analyze them empirically. 
The confidence shown by investors concerning the information they have leads to over-reaction on their 
part, increasing the volume of their transactions when they notice positive returns of portfolio assets. Because 
these investors overestimate their judgment capabilities, they undervalue their exposure to risk, acting 
aggressively and increasing the volume of securities traded. 
In our view, a confidence-based investment behavior will react as follows: if security returns on the previous 
day are positive (including zero), then overreaction implies that heavy transaction is expected on the current 
day; on the contrary, if security returns are negative, investors will either continue their trading strategy or 
refrain from trading. Thus, the relation between the independent variable and this dependent variable will be 
the effect of previous returns (positive or negative) on the trading volume. More specifically, the confident 
















                                                            (1) 
 
Optimism occurs when on the preceding day investors reach a certain previously set level of profit, in this 
case actively reacting by increasing the volume of transactions. If the returns obtained are lower than that level, 
they will react normally or decide to refrain from trading. In our study, we considered the minimum level 
tolerated by optimists depending on which they decide on their trading behaviour to be the value obtained by 
summing the average return and its standard deviation, calculated for the entire period under analysis (R + ı) 
(apud Dhaoui, 2011). Thus, optimistic investors will trade aggressively when the returns of the preceding 
period are equal to or greater than the value set by them, or else they will delay trading. More specifically, the 
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Pessimism occurs when investors incur loss the previous day. Pessimistic investors limit their trading level 
(or refrain from trading) when they notice that their loss reaches a certain set level. They act normally when 
they achieve better results than this level. In our analysis, we considered the minimum loss level tolerated by 
pessimists depending on which they decide on their trading behavior to be the value obtained by subtracting 
from the average profitability its standard deviation, calculated for the entire period under analysis  
(apud Dhaoui, 2011). Thus, pessimistic investors will not trade when the loss in the previous period is greater 
than the value set by them; otherwise, if the loss is smaller than the limit, they will continue to trade. Thus, the 
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The theory of rational expectations was formulated by J. Muth, 1961, (Rational Expectations and the 
Theory of Price Movements, Econometrica, Volume 29, Issue 3, 315-335) and subsequently became really 
influential in modelling economic phenomena. The hypothesis of rational expectations makes it possible to 
explain both the occurrence of the deviations in the noticed economic variables from equilibrium values and the 
action of forces which bring those values to their equilibrium levels (Cerna, 2004). Rational anticipation is a 
reaction aimed at completing the theory of adaptive expectations via Keynes-Friedman, but also a critical 
response to all twentieth-century rationality opponents (Pohoa܊ă, 2011, p 116). 
Investors’ rational expectations of the future value of a given security quotation in accordance with the 
efficient market hypothesis can be represented mathematically as follows: 
 
111 İ +++ += tttt PEP
                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
where Pt+1  is the security price at time t+1, and İt+1 is the estimation error. The only term in the equation 
above, randomly determined by new information (unknown to any of the investors), is the residual factor. It has 
a normal distribution, a zero average and finite dispersion. Today’s random residual factor is independent of 
any previous residual factors, therefore following a random path and being unpredictable on the basis of past 
information. 
In our study, we determined the value of the returns expected by a reasonable investor E(Rt) by taking into 
account the profitability obtained on a previous date Rt-1 and the residual factor specific to previous moment İt-1, 
in accordance with the following formula:  
 
11)( −− += ttt RRE ε                                                                                                                                  (5) 
After turning the initial series of returns into four data sets corresponding to each independent variable, 
according to the methodology described above, in order to test the influence of these factors on the dependent 
variable, trading volume, we calculated the following linear regression: 
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εβββββ +++++= rationalpessimismoptimismconfidencevolume 43210)ln(           (6) 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
Using regression, we can highlight the impact of the investors’ rational expectations and behaviour errors on 
the trading volume for the two emerging capital markets considered. 
Table 1 below shows the results of regressions in trading volume as dependent variable, according to each 
independent variable. Among the latter, we included two classes of investors, those acting on the market on the 
basis of rational expectations and those acting on the basis of animal spirit behaviour (that is those who trust 
the available information, the optimists and the pessimists). 
 
Table 1. Coefficients of independent variables  
 
Capital market Independent variables Coefficients t-statistic  
Romania 
constant 17.64049 181.5206 
R-square = 0.016 
Confidence 0.078432 1.152614 
Optimism 0.153832 1.395220 
Pessimism -0.350165 -3.210506* 
Rational -6.17E-13 -0.044856 
Brazil 
constant 14.59191 666.9603 
R-square = 0.014 
Confidence -0.006440 -0.020327 
Optimism 0.089768 1.897672** 
Pessimism -0.100877 -0.318417 
Rational -3.36E-12 -1.081877 
Source: own calculations, using E-views software 
*significant at 1% 
**significant at 10% 
 
The results in the table indicate that, on a capital market, the investors’ rational expectations fail to explain 
trading volume variability. Thus, the rationality hypothesis can be rejected for both capital markets. However, 
the results indicate that trading is influenced by the investors’ irrational behaviour. On the Romanian capital 
market, pessimistic investors have the greatest influence on the trading volume, whereas on the Brazilian 
capital market, it is optimistic investors who influence the market activity in the largest measure. The results 
are not surprising. In fact, Romania’s population is distrustful of the future, politics, media, etc. This implies 
that these investors have considerable aversion to risk. They react negatively after each crisis or loss, no matter 
how insignificant it may be. This may explain the negative effect of pessimistic investors on the trading volume 
for the stock market in Romania. 
In the case of the stock market in Brazil, optimistic investors react positively following the profit made. 
They increase the volume of securities traded in anticipation of opportunities that may arise in the short term 
and that can be turned to the advantage of these investors. Their excessive reaction leads to a significant 
increase in the trading volume on the Brazilian stock market. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, behavioural errors (optimism, pessimism, depression, anxiety, etc.) steadily win the dispute 
against reasonable behaviour. And when these different psychological make-ups occur in an overwhelming 
number of individuals, the effects are similar to those of tornadoes. For the intelligent investor, this is nothing 
but an opportunity. There is another important point to make with reference to the emotional factor: humans 
behave like animals, feeling safe in a crowd (crowd behaviour). If the others do the same, this confirms the 
wisdom of their decisions. 
 This study could be extended by analyzing the contribution of psychological factors underlying investor 
behaviour to the fluctuations in capital market activity over different periods of time (days, weeks, months, 
years, etc.). It would be interesting to analyze the contribution of these factors during the economic recession in 
recent years for emerging capital markets compared to developed capital markets.  
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